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CONSENT AND THE USE OF FORCE: AN EXAMINATION OF
‘INTERVENTION BY INVITATION’ AS A BASIS FOR US DRONE
STRIKES IN PAKISTAN, SOMALIA AND YEMEN
Max Byrne*
Drone strikes are becoming a key feature of the United States’ global military response to non-
state actors, and it has been widely adduced that these strikes have been carried out with the
consent of the host states in which such non-state actors reside. This article examines the
degree to which assertions of consent (or ‘intervention by invitation’), provided as a
justiﬁcation for drone strikes by the United States in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, can be
said to accord with international law. First the article provides a broad sketch of the
presence of consent in international law. It then analyses in detail the individual elements of
consent as provided by Article 20 of the International Law Commission Draft Articles of
State Responsibility. These require that consent should be ‘valid’, given by the legitimate
government and expressed by an ofﬁcial empowered to do so. These elements will be dealt
with individually, and each in turn will be applied to the cases of Pakistan, Yemen and
Somalia. Finally, the article will examine the breadth of the exculpatory power of consent,
and the extent to which it can preclude the wrongfulness of acts carried out in contravention
of international law other than the prohibition of the use of force under Article 2(4) of the
Charter of the United Nations.
Keywords: consent; intervention by invitation; drones; use of force; jus ad bellum; state
responsibility
I. Introduction
The consent1 of states in which non-state actors (NSAs) reside (hereinafter, ‘host states’) has been
widely advanced as a justiﬁcation for the United States’ programme of drone strikes. Such strikes
have been carried out against NSAs in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. By virtue of its regular and
wide invocation, the ‘intervention by invitation’ justiﬁcation represents a key strand of the dis-
course of drone-based violence and international law and yet it has been largely overlooked by
the literature on drones.2 Often, consent is dealt with ﬂeetingly, in favour of questions surrounding
the jus ad bellum sensu stricto (and particularly the right of self-defence) which, though of vital
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis.
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This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License
(http://creativecommons.org/Licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
1It is submitted that the terms ‘consent’ and ‘invitation to intervene’ are synonymous when the former is
applied to the use of force, as is the case herein. It is arguable that ‘invitation to intervene’ has temporal con-
notations that suggest it is necessarily given prior to a use of force; however, there is no evidence that this is
actually the case. As such, the two terms (and other permutations) will be used interchangeably throughout.
2A notable exception to this is the recent publication of an in-depth study of drone use speciﬁcally in Paki-
stan, which contains a chapter dealing solely with consent. See Sikander A Shah, International Law and
Drone Strikes in Pakistan (Routledge, 2015).
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importance, do not give a full picture. This work will examine in isolation the use of consent as a
justiﬁcation for drone strikes by the US, focusing speciﬁcally on those occurring in Pakistan,
Yemen and Somalia. The aim is to assess whether and to what extent the consent of host states
has historically provided a basis for the lawfulness of drone strikes and the degree to which it
is a tenable justiﬁcation in those particular instances.
Consent, in justifying foreign intervention, has the potential to be posited in a quasi-panacean
manner which risks foreclosing debate both on the nature of the doctrine itself but also on the use
of drones more generally. The invocation of consent can act to provide an apparent basis for uses
of force with such persuasive power that critique is effectively precluded. Despite this, though
perhaps because of it, the issue of consent and drone strikes has not received the level of analysis
that it merits. Recognising this deﬁcit, this article seeks to determine the degree to which consent
can actually be understood to provide a lawful basis upon which drone strikes have been and con-
tinue to be carried out. The focus will be the US drone programme exclusively as it represents the
sole example of consent being invoked as a legal justiﬁcation for wide-scale extraterritorial drone
use.
A doctrinal methodology has been adopted, as it is important at this stage (that is, the early
examination of a hitherto underexplored issue) to consider how the use of drones ﬁts within
the legal framework. As such, attention is not given to the broader international relations impli-
cations of the consent to drone strikes, though these would similarly beneﬁt from investigation.
Nonetheless, an epistemological understanding of international law is present, in which the law as
such is understood to be a discursive practice, a ‘[p]olitical struggle…waged… on the meaning
of legal symbols’.3 Law is recognised as being subject to competing interpretation by states, insti-
tutions and commentators, which impacts upon the way that it operates in a practical sense. By
adopting this epistemological position, it is acknowledged that international law cannot be con-
ceived of as a static and monolithic structure in which, for instance, the use of drones in a speciﬁc
situation can be said with absolute certainty to be legal. International law is dynamic in a way that
is not conducive to Herculean right answers. This approach is particularly necessary when exam-
ining a doctrine like consent, due to its inherent conceptual indistinctness.
The doctrine of intervention by invitation is not codiﬁed in any single place. A broad outline
of the elements of consent, as lex generalis, is however provided by Article 20 of the Draft
Articles on State Responsibility (DASR) and the accompanying commentary from the Inter-
national Law Commission (ILC). Though relating to consent in international law in a general
sense, Article 20 is direct applicable to the lex specialis of intervention by invitation. As such,
the outline presented by the DASR will be used as an overall framework for analysis.
First, the article will consider the presence of consent as a basis for the use of force in inter-
national law. Second to be considered will be the primary speciﬁcation of Article 20 DASR that
consent should be ‘valid’ in order to preclude the wrongfulness of an act, which will then be
applied to the use of drone strikes by the US. Building upon this (though arguably still within
the framework of ‘validity’) is the requirement that consent can only be given by the ‘legitimate’
government,4 so the third section will consider the nature of legitimacy and the degree to which
various regimes consenting to drone strikes can be seen to be legitimate. The fourth section will
examine the related requirement that consent should be given by an ofﬁcial authorised to represent
3Martti Koskenniemi, ‘What Should International Lawyers Learn from Karl Marx?’ (2004) 17 Leiden
Journal of International Law 229, 236.
4ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries
(2001), General Assembly Ofﬁcial Records 56th session, supplement no 10 (A/56/10), Art 20, para 5.
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the government5 and how this applies to the consent given to drone strikes. The ﬁfth and ﬁnal
section will discuss the fact that Article 20 couches consent in both positive and negative terms:
consent is given ‘to the commission of an act’ but also ‘to the extent that the act remains within
the limits of that consent’.6 This reference to the bounded nature of consent makes it necessary
to consider the breadth of action rendered lawful by invitation and the debate around whether
consent allows an intervening state to deviate from other rules of international law (for instance,
international humanitarian law (IHL) or international human rights law (IHRL)).
II. Consent in International Law
i. Consent and the Use of Force
Consent is a manifestation of the ‘sovereign equality’ of states, the underlying principle of the
United Nations (UN) as enshrined in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter (UNC). In relation to this,
consent is also the product of an international system that seeks to preserve the autonomy of
states. This is evidenced in, inter alia, the Article 2(4) UNC prohibition on ‘the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state’. This provenance, par-
ticularly emphasising the autonomy of states’ internal practices, enables the discussion of consent
in terms of ‘sovereignty’, despite the conceptual difﬁculties sometimes attributed to this word.7
A logical corollary of the UNC’s privileging of the sovereignty and autonomy of states is that
a state may ostensibly govern all activity that is carried out within its own territory. As such, states
prima facie have the capacity to invite interventions from third states. Therefore, consent from one
state to another’s use of force within its territory, as an exercise of sovereignty, removes that
speciﬁc use of force from the jus ad bellum framework of the UNC. This is because, if valid,
the use of force does not infringe the ‘territorial integrity or political independence of any
state’,8 but is instead a manifestation of that state’s agency and political independence.9 This
has recently been emphasised by the International Law Association’s Use of Force Committee,
in its draft report on aggression and the use of force, in which it distinguished consent from
5Ibid, Art 20, paras 4 and 6.
6Ibid, Art 20, para 1.
7See, for example, Louis Henkin, ‘The Mythology of Sovereignty’ in Ronald St John Macdonald (ed),
Essays in Honour of Wang Tieya (Martinus Nijhoff, 1994) 351.
8Charter of the United Nations (1945), Art 2(4).
9A possible issue with regard to consent in the speciﬁc context of the use of force arises when it is claimed
that the prohibition of the use of force is a peremptory norm of international law. If this is so, it is arguable
that regardless of consent, the use of force would remain unlawful as Art 26 DASR asserts that consent
cannot preclude the wrongfulness of ‘any act of a State which is not in conformity with an obligation
arising under a peremptory norm of general international law’. The debate as to the possibility that the pro-
hibition of the use of force is jus cogens is far beyond the scope of the present article but nonetheless it can be
addressed in brief in two ways. First, it is far from clear whether or not the prohibition is in fact jus cogens.
The present writer is of the opinion that, though desirable, the prohibition has not met the requisite threshold
for recognition as a jus cogens norm (for an informative discussion of this issue, see James A Green, ‘Ques-
tioning the Peremptory Status of the Prohibition of the Use of Force’ (2011) 32 Michigan Journal of Inter-
national Law 215). Second, if the prohibition were a peremptory norm it would nevertheless continue to have
exceptions, in the form of self-defence and Chapter VII actions, but also by consent. See Ulf Linderfalk, ‘The
Effect of Jus Cogens Norms: Whoever Opened Pandora’s Box, Did You Ever Think About the Conse-
quences?’ (2007) 18 European Journal of International Law 853, 860 (rightly stating that ‘[a] correct
description of the norm would have to account for the fact that the principle of non-use of force does
have exceptions’). In light of these two points, it is submitted that the possibility of the prohibition of the
use of force being jus cogens does not impede the operation of consent in the manner analysed within
this article.
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the ‘excused violations’ of sovereignty (self-defence and actions under Chapter VII UNC), as
‘consent involves no violation of state sovereignty ab initio’.10
That a state can consent to acts otherwise contrary to its sovereignty is recognisable broadly
within international law. Article 2(7) UNC states that ‘[n]othing contained in the present Charter
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the dom-
estic jurisdiction of any state’ emphasising the preservation of states’ capacity to govern them-
selves, which extends to inviting uses of force within their territory.11 In a similarly implicit
manner, consent features in the 1974 Deﬁnition of Aggression, which includes within the cat-
egory of aggressive acts the ‘use of armed forces which are within the territory of another
State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for
in the agreement’,12 thereby indirectly acknowledging the existence of consent as a self-
evident part of the international legal framework.
The presence of the doctrine is made explicit in the DASR, in which consent is speciﬁcally
posited as having the capacity to preclude the wrongfulness of acts otherwise contrary to inter-
national law.13 Article 20 DASR speciﬁcally refers to consent ‘by a State’ and it is important
though elementary to note that states are incapable of consenting to anything, rather their govern-
ments consent on their behalf. While states are ‘non-physical juridical entities’, governments are
‘the exclusively legally coercive organizations for making and enforcing certain group
decisions’.14 It is a ‘basic principle’ in international law that ‘the government speaks for the
State and acts on its behalf’.15 Indeed, Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on the Rights
and Duties of States speciﬁcally cleaves state and government.
This uncontroversial though fundamental point makes it clear why consent is structured as it
is, hinging on the legitimacy of the consenting regime. It is crucial that a consenting government
is legitimate (and that, in turn, consent is given by a requisite ofﬁcial), because it is, in the eyes of
international law, the voice of the state. It is because of the representative capacity of the govern-
ment vis-à-vis the state that consent to intervention cannot be given by a government embroiled in
a civil war. Once a government has lost control to such a degree that it is merely one of two or
several parties to a civil war, it can no longer be understood to speak on behalf of the state. In
addition, intervention in civil wars is impermissible due to ‘the inalienable right of every state
to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems’.16
Though the state is distinct from its governmental voice, it is the sole prerogative of the state,
qua its inhabitants, to choose that voice. If intervention is invited by a government that is a mere
belligerent party, then the right to choose would be effectively removed from the state. The right
of a state to choose its own destiny is clearly present within international law. The UN General
Assembly’s Declaration on Friendly Relations asserts that all states have ‘the duty to refrain
from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in
10International Law Association Committee on the Use of Force, Washington Conference ‘Report on
Aggression and the Use of Force’ (2014), www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/DA12E88E-5E44-4151-
9540DC83D4A0EA78 B.4. Though this report remains a draft, yet to be agreed by the ILA, it nonetheless
represents the considered opinions of over 30 of the world’s leading experts on the use of force in inter-
national law and, as such, possesses signiﬁcant authoritative weight.
11Emphasis added.
12General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) Deﬁnition of Aggression (1974), Art 3(e), emphasis added.
13DASR and Commentary (n 4), Art 20.
14Edward H Robinson, ‘The Distinction between State and Government’ (2013) 7/8 Geography Compass
556, 561.
15Louise Doswald-Beck, ‘The Legal Validity of Military Intervention by Invitation of the Government’
(1986) 56(1) British Yearbook of International Law 189, 190.
16Christine Gray, The Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University Press, 3rd edn 2008) 81.
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another State’.17 Moreover, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has stated that this is an obli-
gation present in customary international law.18 Thus, with regard to the doctrine of consent, there
is a twofold prohibition on intervention during civil wars. While consent to intervention in limited
conﬂicts is lawful, it is not lawful in conﬂicts of a more systemic nature characterised by a state’s
internal determination of its own government.
Not only is consent to intervention a principle of international law, it appears to have a foun-
dational and pre-eminent character. Gray has asserted that the post-war right of states to request
intervention has been ‘taken for granted’19 and the ILC has called consent a ‘basic international
law principle’.20 Echoing this, Schmitt, writing speciﬁcally about drones, has touched brieﬂy on
consent, claiming that it is ‘indisputable that one state may employ force in another with the
consent of that state’.21 Such assertions reﬂect the doctrine’s genesis within the privileging of
state sovereignty in international law. However, Schmitt’s assertion incidentally reveals an impor-
tant characteristic of consent within the discourse on drone strikes more generally: the notion of
the ‘indisputability’ of consent is so privileged that it does not feature in Schmitt’s analysis of
drone strikes, which instead speciﬁcally focuses on ‘operations… conducted without the [host]
state’s acquiescence’.22 Consent viewed in this manner reveals its capacity to be understood as
a principle with such exculpatory force that it acts like a trump card, vitiating the possibility of
critical analysis once it has been posited. This epitomises the problematic theme within the dis-
course on consent referred to above, which has led to a lacuna in the literature.
Recalling the discursive and interpretive epistemology of international law, a consequence of
the exculpatory potential of consent at one end of consent’s hermeneutic spectrum is that
interpretations of the doctrine lend themselves to the dichotomy of ‘restrictionism’ and ‘expan-
sionism’, in terms of the degree to which it is understood to permit or proscribe the resort to
force. This dichotomy is more immediately applicable to jus ad bellum than to consent—
for instance, Jackson Moagoto has asserted its presence as a debate around self-defence23—but
it is nevertheless an informative analytical tool for present purposes. Under a restrictionist
interpretation, consent can be understood as providing a limited legitimation for the use of
force, which is open to rebuttal. Conversely, the expansionist interpretation creates a strong pre-
sumption of lawfulness that cannot easily be challenged. The discourse on drones and consent has
been dominated by expansionist understandings, which has resulted in a paucity of discussion of
this area in favour of the apparently more controversial areas of jus ad bellum and jus in bello.
17General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
(1970), UN Doc A/RES/25/2625.
18In its Nicaragua decision, the ICJ asserted that the Declaration on Friendly Relations ‘affords an indication
of [states’] opinio juris as to customary international law’: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (merits) [1986] ICJ Reports 14, para 191.
This has been afﬁrmed subsequently by the Court, stating explicitly that the provisions ‘are declaratory of
customary international law’: Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v Uganda) (merits) [2005] ICJ Reports 168, para 162.
19Gray (n 16) 85. Supporting the idea of consent as axiomatic, Gray refers to multiple examples of state prac-
tice in which force was used consensually with no international condemnation: France’s interventions in
Gabon (1964), Chad (1968), Côte d’Ivoire (2002) and Senegal’s intervention in Guinea-Bissau (1998).
20DASR and Commentary (n 4) Art 20, para 1.
21Michael N Schmitt, ‘Drone Attacks under the Jus as Bellum and Jus in Bello: Clearing the “Fog of Law”’
(2010) 13 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 311, 315.
22Ibid.
23Jackson Maogoto, Technology and the Law on the Use of Force (Routledge, 2015) 12-13.
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The presence of consent to foreign intervention is evident in the practice of states, conﬁrming
its continued acceptance as a doctrine of international law. The recent actions by the US and the
UK against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Iraq were based on the invitation of
the Iraqi government.24 Consent was the sole legal justiﬁcation adduced by President Obama for
the 2014 action in Iraq, rather than relying on alternatives like humanitarian intervention.25 This
has been restated recently by Stephen Preston, General Counsel of the US Department of
Defence, who called consent ‘a ﬁrm foundation in international law’.26 In similar fashion, the
UK government stated that the ‘prohibition [on the use of force] does not apply to the use of mili-
tary force by one State on the territory of another if the territorial State so requests or consents’27 It
is noteworthy that this document interpreted consent as ‘provid[ing] a clear and unequivocal legal
basis’ for the use of force,28 demonstrating the power consent is seen to possess for engendering
the use of force. The absence of equivocality gestures towards an expansionist interpretation, in
which consent creates a strong presumption of lawfulness.
Echoing this understanding, the then-Prime Minister of Australia Tony Abbott described
force used with consent as ‘perfectly, perfectly legal under international law’,29 again em-
phasising the doctrine’s rhetorical power. Abbott’s depiction of consent as providing a ‘perfect’
justiﬁcation for the use of force, with the implications of irrefutability that this carries with it,
mirrors the UK’s reference to unequivocality, and further demonstrates the ability of consent to
limit critique. These assured proclamations by states as to the nature of consent demonstrate
both the doctrine’s presence in international law as virtually axiomatic but also its strength,
emphasising the vital need for in-depth examination of consent, particularly in the case of
drone strikes.
ii. Consent and Drone Strikes
The US has utilised consent to attest to the lawfulness of its drone programme together with the
jus ad bellum doctrine of self-defence (this article will consider host states’ expressions of consent
24In meeting the threat from ISIL, states have also referred to collective self-defence under Art 51, though
these invocations have related to action against ISIL in Syria (letter dated 23 September 2014 from the Per-
manent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-
General, UN Doc S/2014/695; letter dated 31 March 2015 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent
Mission of Canada to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2015/
221). In contrast, it is consent that has been emphasised for uses of force in Iraq (Rob Page, ‘ISIS and the
Sectarian Conﬂict in the Middle East’ (19 March 2015) Research Paper 15/16, House of Commons Library
54). This is a distinction made recently by the British Member of Parliament and chairman of the Defence
Select Committee, Julian Lewis (quoted in Frances Perraudin, ‘David Cameron Making up Syria Policy “On
the Hoof”—Senior Tory’ (July 2015) The Guardian, www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/jul/19/david-
cameron-syria-policy-julian-lewis?INTCMP=sﬂ).
25Text of a letter from the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate (23 September 2014), www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁce/2014/09/23/letter-
president-war-powers-resolution-regarding-iraq.
26Stephen Preston, ‘The Legal Framework for the United States’ Use of Military Force Since 9/11’ (April
2015) speech at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law www.defense.gov/
Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1931.
27Summary of the Government Legal Position on Military Action in Iraq Against ISIL (25 September 2014),
www.gov.uk/government/publications/military-action-in-iraq-against-isil-government-legal-position/
summary-of-the-government-legal-position-on-military-action-in-iraq-against-isil.
28Ibid, emphasis added.
29‘Interview with Fran Kelly, ABC Radio National’ (16 September 2014) Department of the Prime Minister
and Cabinet, https://pmtranscripts.dpmc.gov.au/release/transcript-23831.
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throughout, rather than précising them in this ﬁrst section). Immediately, the fact that consent and
self-defence have been adduced in tandem is interesting as, despite the understanding that states
take of consent detailed above, which provides a strong presumption of exculpation in its bypass-
ing of questions of jus ad bellum, the US has nonetheless not relied on consent alone to justify its
drone programme. Indeed, in Harold Koh’s 2010 speech to the American Society of International
Law, self-defence was the sole justiﬁcation given for drone strikes.30 Although the provision of
multiple justiﬁcations is common practice in international law,31 the resort to two legal claims by
the US suggests a pragmatic equivocation which gestures towards the fallibility of consent as a
principle justifying the use of force, in contrast to its cast-iron image that is presented rhetorically.
This further demonstrates the necessity for critical analysis of consent to be undertaken, rather
than for it to be accepted as akin to a panacean justiﬁcation.
The invocation of consent by the US has primarily been through brief references. In a 2012
speech, US Attorney General Eric Holder stressed that extraterritorial uses of force were ‘consist-
ent with international legal principles if conducted…with the consent of the nation involved’.32
He did not go further and discuss the nature or requirements of consent but his reference allows
the inference that the US is prepared to rely on it to bypass the prohibition on the use of force.
Similar sentiment was expressed by the US Department of Justice (in the context of targeting a
US citizen33), which emphasised that extraterritorial force carried out with consent ‘would be con-
sistent with international legal principles of sovereignty and neutrality’.34 In 2012, in the Obama
administration’s ﬁrst acknowledgement of its covert drone programme, then-Homeland Security
Advisor, John Brennan, referred speciﬁcally to consent as providing a basis for the lawful use of
drones.35 These references to consent make it clear that the doctrine has been key to the use of
drones by the US. Nonetheless, it has been subject to far less stringent appraisal and analysis
than self-defence. The subsequent sections of this article will consider in turn the key require-
ments of consent and will apply them to the speciﬁc contexts of drone strikes in Pakistan,
Yemen and Somalia, with the intention of providing a much-needed and thus far absent
examination.
III. Consent Must Be ‘Valid’
Article 20 DASR refers to the need for consent to be ‘valid’ in order for it to preclude wrongful-
ness. In essence this entire article deals with the validity of consent, as each requirement identiﬁed
30See Harold Koh, ‘The Obama Administration and International Law’ (March, 2010) speech at the Annual
Meeting of the American Society of International Law (stating that the US ‘may use force consistent with its
inherent right to self-defense under international law’), www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.
31For instance, in justifying its intervention in Grenada in 1983, the US posited three bases, consent being
one of them (the other two being protection of nationals and collective self-defence (see letter dated 25
October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc S/16076)).
32Eric Holder, ‘Attorney General Eric Holder Speaks at Northwestern University School of Law’ (2012),
United States Department of Justice, www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-
northwestern-university-school-law. See also John O Brennan (White House Counterterrorism Advisor),
‘The Ethics and Efﬁcacy of the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy’ (April 2012) prepared remarks at
the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efﬁcacy-and-
ethics-us-counterterrorism-strategy.
33US Department of Justice, White Paper ‘Lawfulness for a Lethal Operation Directed Against a US Citizen
Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of al-Qa’ida or an Associated Force’ (2011), 1, http://msnbcmedia.msn.
com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf.
34Ibid.
35Brennan (n 32).
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above cumulatively sits within the framework of ‘validly’ given consent. Nonetheless, to enable a
more thorough analysis, these are considered separately below and in detail, while this section
considers validity more broadly.
The ILC commentary to the DASR states that areas of international law other than state
responsibility govern the concept of validity36 but its provisions are nonetheless illuminating.
The ILC interpretation of validly given consent requires that it:
…must be freely given and clearly established. It must be actually expressed by the State rather than
merely presumed on the basis that the State would have consented if it had been asked. Consent may
be vitiated by error, fraud, corruption or coercion.37
This understanding is similar to the deﬁnition of ‘request’ in the Institut de Droit International
(IDI) Resolution on Military Assistance on Request, which must ‘[reﬂect] the free expression
of will of the requesting State and its consent to the terms and modalities of the military assist-
ance’.38 Further illustration is provided by the ILC commentary on Article 45 DASR, governing
the waiver of a state’s right to invoke state responsibility, which is analogous to consent as it pro-
vides state acquiescence to outside intervention after the fact—in effect, consent ex post facto.
The commentary states that a waiver can be inferred through unilateral statements or conduct,
but is ﬁrm in specifying that ‘the conduct or statement must be unequivocal’.39 Finally, the vitiat-
ing power of fraud, corruption and coercion manifests elsewhere in international law, principally
in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (VCLT) Articles 49 and 50—in which
fraud or corruption can invalidate consent—and 51 and 52 which render treaties respectively
without legal validity or void if agreement was procured by coercion, either against the state
representative40 or the state itself with the threat or use of force.41
Therefore it is clear that, at a minimum, consent must represent the true, voluntary and clear
intention of a state. This emphasis on clarity and voluntariness is present in the jurisprudence of
the ICJ, which asserted, in the Armed Activities case, that a state may withdraw consent with ‘no
particular formalities’.42 Although the Court left open the question of the level of renunciation
required to retract consent, the fact that such severance is possible through inference (in the
case itself, withdrawal of consent was inferred through the DRC’s accusation that Uganda had
invaded its territory43) demonstrates an underlying privileging of state sovereignty over the
ability of states to resort to force and suggests a high threshold for consent to be valid. By
setting such a threshold, the judgment in Armed Activities incidentally betrays a restrictionist
thread in the ICJ’s interpretation, distinct from the emphasis present in state practice that
consent is unequivocal, thereby demonstrating that the Court resides in a distinct hermeneutic
camp. This has the effect of evoking the indeterminacy of international law generally and the
inherently indistinct nature of consent as a doctrine.
International law scholars have also posited interpretations of consent that vary in their
requirements for validity. Like the ICJ, Mary Ellen O’Connell has adopted a view of valid
36DASR and Commentary (n 4), Art 20, para 4.
37Ibid, Art 20, para 6.
38Resolution on Military Assistance on Request (2011) Institut de Droit International, 10th Commission—
Sub-Group C, Art 1(b).
39DASR and Commentary (n 4), Art 45, para 5.
40Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Art 51.
41Ibid, Art 52.
42Armed Activities (n 18) para 51.
43Ibid, para 53.
8 M. Byrne
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 R
ea
din
g]
 at
 06
:32
 19
 A
pr
il 2
01
6 
consent that advocates sovereignty, though she goes further, arguing for the need for ‘express,
public consent’,44 suggesting that validity requires publicity. In opposition to this, Sean
Murphy has rejected a requirement of publicity. Emphasising the arbitral nature of international
dispute settlement, Murphy has argued instead that even when secret, consent could ultimately be
adduced in ‘whatever venue is necessary’ to conﬁrm its presence and legality after the fact,
thereby negating the need for publicity.45 It is unclear from where O’Connell gets support for
her publicity argument as such a requirement is not present in any international legal documents,
nor does it appear to be a requirement of customary international law.
Sikander Shah has recalled the general principle promoting publicity arising out of the League
of Nations’ prohibition on secret agreements to argue that secret consent is at best ‘legally ques-
tionable in the context of international law’.46 This is a persuasive line of reasoning but Article 18
of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to which Shah refers, relates to the agreement of treaties
speciﬁcally. It is therefore only applicable by analogy to consent to the use of force, which is of a
distinct character, and, as such, the Article does not resolve the issue.
Indeed, the possibility of non-public consent was asserted by the then-Special Rapporteur
Roberto Ago in his report on state responsibility to the ILC, stating that ‘like all manifestations
of the will of a State… consent can be expressed or tacit, explicit or implicit’.47 Furthermore,
the (far from exhaustive) list of examples given by the ILC of activities that might be consented
to includes, for instance, ‘ofﬁcial investigations or inquiries’ which could conceivably be con-
sented to without publicity.48 Although perhaps desirable, it appears to be a reality of the doctrine
that there is no conﬂation between the clarity and publicity, the latter going quite a bit further than
the former. Therefore, on balance it appears that though consent must represent the true intention
of a state, it need not be public in order to be valid.
In his analysis of the lawfulness of drone use in Pakistan, Jordan Paust has utilised a very
broad reading of self-defence under Article 51 UNC and early customary international law to
come to the expansionist conclusion that, in the speciﬁc instance of a non-state actor (NSA)
attacking a state other than its host, consent need not be valid in the sense of having been
freely given for an intervention to be lawful. This is because, Paust argues, self-defence will
always provide a lawful avenue of response, rendering consent unnecessary per se.49 In this
way, the validity of consent is beside the point, as justiﬁcation for the use of drone strikes
against NSAs will always come unquestionably in the form of self-defence. Paust’s approach
is thus opposed to that of the ICJ in terms of its balance between sovereignty and security by posit-
ing self-defence as the principal mechanism for responding to NSA violence. This is not to say
that Paust sees no place for consent in the use of force—he refers to the ICJ’s assertion in
Armed Activities that consent need not be adduced when a state seeks to rely on self-defence,50
suggesting that he too is referring only to such situations of claimed self-defence, and leaving
open the possibility of a separate, consent-based justiﬁcation outside of the jus ad bellum.
44Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones’ (2010) Notre Dame Law School Research
Paper, 18, emphasis added.
45Sean D Murphy, ‘The International Legality of US Military Cross-Border Operations from Afghanistan
into Pakistan’ (2009) 85 International Legal Studies 109, 118.
46Shah (n 2) 102.
47Roberto Ago, ‘Eighth Report on State Responsibility’, UN Doc A/CN.4/318 and ADD.1-4 (1979) 2(1)
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 3, 35, emphasis in original.
48DASR and Commentary (n 4) Art 20, para 2.
49Jordon J Paust, ‘Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of US Use of Drones in
Pakistan’ (2009–10) 19 Journal of Transnational law and Policy 237, 249–50.
50Jordon J Paust, ‘Operationalizing Use of Drones against Non-State Terrorists under the International Law
of Self-Defense’ (2015) 7 Albany Government Law Review 166, 175.
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Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that consent does not play a part in Paust’s analysis of drone
strikes, as, by privileging security over sovereignty, it suggests implicit assumptions as to the
agency of those states that (perhaps) are unwittingly harbouring NSAs. This is a problematic
interpretation of consent for a number of reasons: ﬁrst, it fails to take account of the many
occasions in which force has been used with the consent of the host state, including those
cases of (purported) consent to US drone strikes. Secondly, such a view does not account for
the clear and fundamental existence of consent as a doctrine within international law. Finally,
in failing to acknowledge the agency of states playing host to NSAs, this approach disempowers
less powerful states internationally by ostensibly removing them from the process of responding
to attacks by NSAs.
A similar approach to consent is proposed by Arnulf Lorca, who has produced an interpret-
ation that is highly permissive of the use of force. This involves an analytical perspective of the
‘semi-periphery’, which involves ‘balancing conﬂicting rules and policies from the standpoint of
weaker states that are vulnerable to hostile non-state actor presences in their territory and, there-
fore, more likely subject to interventions’.51 This perspective is used to develop an understanding
of so-called ‘cohabitant states’ in which governments ‘might be willing but might be too weak to
effectively act against the non-state actor, as in the case of Yemen’.52 In this situation, Lorca
asserts that the cohabitant state can neither acquiesce nor object to intervention, removing
consent as an avenue to the lawful use of force.53 His suggestion is instead to imply consent in
such situations, thereby permitting force in the absence of actual validly given consent, though
he calls for the simultaneous implication of strict conditions upon the intervening state.54 This
concept of consent thereby transforms the nature of validity from that requiring free and clear
intention, as envisioned by international institutions, to one based entirely around a state’s capa-
bility to address a resident NSA. As with Paust’s analysis above, this negates the agency of
weaker states and can therefore be understood to represent an expansionist interpretation of
consent, reducing the standing of host state sovereignty in order to allow victim states to intervene
with military force more readily.
Despite the presence of expansionist readings of consent, the interpretations emphasising val-
idity through freely and clearly proffered intention are more reﬂective of the reality of inter-
national law. Therefore the need to determine the actual free and clear provision of consent by
a host state’s government is key to asserting the lawfulness of the resort to drone strikes. With
regard to Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, valid consent does appear to be present, or at least has
been operative while many drone strikes have occurred. In Pakistan, consent has been apparently
forthcoming in secret: leaked documents indicate that between 2007 and 2011 the government of
Pakistan and the CIA cooperated closely,55 strongly suggesting valid consent existed at that time.
However, in 2013, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif unambiguously withdrew this consent,
asserting that drone strikes were a violation of sovereignty,56 a position more recently reiterated
51Arnulf B Lorca, ‘Rules for the “Global War on Terror”: Implying Consent and Presuming Conditions for
Intervention’ (2012) 45 NYU Journal of International Law & Policy 1, 9.
52Ibid, 13.
53Ibid, 79.
54Ibid, 55 and 86. The implied conditions include involving the host state and affected communities in tar-
geting decisions, creation of a guarantee fund for reparations for civilian deaths and strict liability for damage
caused to civilians.
55Greg Miller and Bob Woodward, ‘Secret Memos Reveal Explicit Nature of US, Pakistan Agreement on
Drones’ (24 October 2013) Washington Post, www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/top-
pakistani-leaders-secretly-backed-cia-drone-campaign-secret-documents-show/2013/10/23/15e6b0d8-3beb-
11e3-b6a9-da62c264f40e_story.html
56Ibid.
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by the Pakistani foreign ministry.57 Taking the restrictive approach of international institutions,
and the ICJ decision of Armed Activities, in which retraction of consent can be made by inference,
this statement represents a clear withdrawal of consent, removing it as a justiﬁcation for drone
strikes. Its clandestine nature does not undermine the existence and operation of consent prior
to 2013, meaning that, if the other requirements for consent are satisﬁed, drone strikes carried
out in that period will not be subject to jus ad bellum. However, once consent was withdrawn
in 2013 the lawfulness of further drone strikes would be entirely a question of jus ad bellum.58
Conversely, under Lorca’s approach, this retraction would not automatically withdraw the
ability of the US to carry out drone strikes. It would instead transform the question from one
focusing on the fact of consent to one of the nature of Pakistan’s ability to control al-Qaeda,
the Taliban and associated forces, with the potential for valid consent to continue despite govern-
mental protestations by implying consent if the government was unable to neutralise a threat.
In Yemen, consent has reportedly been given by President Hadi for each individual drone
strike59 though the presence of general consent to strikes has also been adduced.60 There is no
assertion that consent has not been freely given and, as such, Yemeni consent is prima facie
valid. Similarly, consent from the government of Somalia has been given freely, with nothing
to suggest that it was the product of fraud or coercion and as such has the appearance of validity.
Nevertheless, validity is only the ﬁrst necessary aspect of consent. Below, the nature of the
consent given by each of these three states will be considered in detail, in relation to distinct
aspects of the doctrine. This will enable a determination of whether or not consent can be under-
stood as having been given.
IV. Consent Must Be Given by the ‘Legitimate Government’
In her pre-eminent study of consent, Doswald-Beck demonstrated that a key test to establish the
effectiveness of consent is to determine whether it was given by the ‘legitimate government’ of a
state.61 This is reiterated as a ground for questioning consent in the ILC commentary to Article 20
DASR.62 Legitimacy of government is directly tied to the distinction between state and govern-
ment discussed above. As the state cannot speak for itself, consent can only be given on its behalf
by its actual representative. At the outset it should be noted that there is a manifest inability of
consent to be given by rebels who, by their nature as the opposition to a state’s government,
cannot themselves speak on behalf of that state, a principle conﬁrmed by the ICJ in Nicaragua.63
In order to ascertain the legitimacy of a government, the principal issue is control of the state, and
the historically key question is whether a government must exert de facto or de jure control over a
57Jon Boone and Stephanie Kirchgaessner, ‘Pakistan Uses Hostage Killings to Underline Risk of US Drone
Strikes’ (April 2015) The Guardian, www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/24/pakistan-us-hostage-
killings-drone-strikes-weinstein-lo-porto.
58Since consent was retracted there have been at least 38 drone strikes carried out within Pakistan. This ﬁgure
is based on a dataset from the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/
1NAfjFonM-Tn7fziqiv33HlGt09wgLZDSCP-BQaux51w/edit#gid=1436874561 (accessed 18 September
2015).
59Greg Miller, ‘Yemeni President Acknowledges Approving US Drone Strikes (29 September 2012)
Washington Post, www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/yemeni-president-acknowledges-
approving-us-drone-strikes/2012/09/29/09bec2ae-0a56-11e2-afff-d6c7f20a83bf_story.html.
60Human Rights Watch. ‘AWedding that Became a Funeral: US Drone Attach on Marriage Procession in
Yemen’ (February 2014), www.hrw.org/sites/default/ﬁles/reports/yemen0214_ForUpload_0.pdf 6.
61Doswald-Beck (n 15) 191.
62DASR and Commentary (n 4) Art 20, para 6.
63Nicaragua (n 18) para 246.
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host state. Nonetheless, it is not immediately clear which of the two modes of control is determi-
native of legitimacy. This question is of vital importance in determining the validity of consent to
drone strikes due to the distinct permutations of government in each of the three states in which
the US has been carrying out drone strikes. Therefore this section will consider the current inter-
national law on legitimacy and consent, before going on to consider the question of governmental
legitimacy in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia to assert whether or not consent can be given in each
of those cases.
In determining legitimacy, the relative dominance of de jure or de facto control is far from
clear. Doswald-Beck draws evidence from pre-UNC arbitral decisions which ﬁrmly favoured a
ﬁnding of legitimacy through de facto control. In the Dreyfus case it was held that ‘the usurper
who in fact holds power with the consent express or tacit of the nation acts… validly in the
name of the State’.64 Similarly the Tinoco arbitration concluded that ‘non-recognition for any
reason… cannot outweigh… the de facto character of Tinoco’s government’.65 Thus the
interpretation by early arbitral bodies, speaking the law as its literal arbiters, ﬁrmly privileged
de facto control, to the exclusion of considerations based on the legal nature of control.
State practice has been more equivocal and, at least in 1986 when Doswald-Beck’s study was
published, de facto control (understood generally to be ‘effective control’66), though still the most
important, was not the sole consideration in determining the legitimacy of the government. There
were instances of consent being accepted from governments that had lost effective control of their
states.67 More recently, the Use of Force Committee of the International Law Association has
opined (in draft) that consent may be given by a government with either de jure or de facto
control, apparently without privileging one or the other.68 DavidWippman, echoing the relaxation
of the de facto control requirement, propounds a reading of legitimacy in which the loss of control
does not vitiate a government’s capacity to consent ‘so long as [it] retains control over the capital
city and does not appear to be in imminent danger of collapse’.69 Despite this it is difﬁcult to
uphold such a speciﬁc formula in the light of Gray’s examination of state practice, which, she
has stressed, provides no uniformity in terms of the required nature of governmental control.70
To add to the multitude of possibilities, Fox has suggested the emergence of a post-Cold War,
governance-based approach, which asserts the legitimacy of those governments with a democratic
mandate.71 He nonetheless counsels caution with regard to this understanding, as all relevant
practice has occurred within the narrow category of elections that were held subject to inter-
national monitoring.72
64Dreyfus Case [1901] Traités du XXe Siècle, 394. Translation provided in B Cheng, General Principles of
International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge University Press, 2006)
188.
65The Tinoco Arbitration (Great Britain v Costa Rica) [1923] 1 RIAA 375. As cited in ‘Decisions, Opinions
and Awards of International Tribunals, 1924–5’ (1924–25) 6 British Yearbook of Ineternational Law 199,
202.
66Per British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington: Hansard (28 April 1980), 408 House of Lords cols 1121–
22, cited in Doswald-Beck (n 15) 194. This is also evident in the jurisprudence of the ICJ: see, for example,
Nicaragua (n 18) para 115.
67Doswald-Beck (n 15) 197–98, citing, inter alia, Lebanon’s invitation to UNIFIL in 1978, despite the army
having little control over the capital.
68ILA Use of Force Committee (n 10).
69David Wippman, ‘Military Intervention, Regional Organizations, and Host-State Consent’ (1996) 7 Duke
Journal of Comparative & International Law 209, 220.
70Gray (n 16) 99.
71Gregory H Fox, ‘Intervention by Invitation’ in M Weller (ed) The Use of Force in International Law
(Oxford University Press, 2015) 834
72Ibid, 837.
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In addition to the above, Doswald-Beck concluded that prior recognition of a government is
‘extremely important’ and that ‘recognition will rarely be withdrawn from an established regime,
even once it has lost control, if there is no new single regime in control to take its place’.73 Rec-
ognition plays a part in assessing the legitimacy of a government but it is not entirely determina-
tive. In his thorough study of the recognition of governments, Stefan Talmon has illustrated the
concept’s dual and intersecting meanings. Recognition can mean one government’s willingness to
‘enter into ofﬁcial relations’ with another, or it can mean that the former recognises that the latter
‘exists as such’.74 As a result of this, non-recognition does ‘not necessarily mean that… the
unrecognised government does not exist as a government in the sense of international law. It
may mean only that the recognizing government is unwilling to enter into normal… relations
with it.’75 Therefore it is conceivable that non-recognition will not always render a government
unable to consent if it maintains de facto control.
Thus the situation remains ambiguous but it appears that the predominant interpretation is that
a government can be legitimate, and may therefore consent to intervention, either by exercising
effective control or, in the absence of such control, if it is recognised by the international commu-
nity and has not yet been replaced by another entity. Nonetheless, even this broad requirement is
questionable as recent state practice by Russia involved the use of its armed forces in Ukraine at
the request of Ukrainian President Yanukovych after he had ﬂed the country76 and been replaced
by an interim government77 (though in a manner that did not accord with the constitution78).
However, the consequent condemnation by the US that the action was an act of aggression79
maintains the notion of consent being available up to the point at which a government is replaced.
It is intriguing to note the recent reference to the doctrine of consent and legitimacy, made by the
UK defence select committee chairman Julian Lewis, who appears to have inverted the legitimacy
requirement, stating that the UK government will not accept Syria’s consent because it ‘doesn’t
want to recognise the legitimacy of the Assad regime’.80 In suggesting this, it appears that the act
of accepting consent can serve to project legitimacy onto a government—a form of international
recognition—as a consequence of accepting consent, rather than consent being a possibility as a
consequence of legitimacy. This inversion has two potential results: ﬁrst, it could suggest a
reduction in the need for legitimacy per se within the doctrine of consent, as it is suggested inher-
ently by the act of accepting consent in itself. This is unconvincing, however, as such a wholesale
change to the doctrine is improbable based on the proclamation of a single national Member of
Parliament. A second, more plausible, inference is that this statement represents the increased
reliance within the international community on de jure control and international recognition
rather than effective control.81
73Ibid, 199.
74Stefan Talmon, Recognition of Governments in International Law (Oxford University Press, 1998) 33
(emphasis in original).
75Ibid.
76Security Council Meetings Coverage, 7125th Meeting (PM) (3 March 2014), www.un.org/press/en/2014/
sc11305.doc.htm
77Harriet Salem, ‘Who Exactly Is Governing Ukraine?’ (4 March 2014) The Guardian, www.theguardian.
com/world/2014/mar/04/who-governing-ukraine-olexander-turchynov.
78James A Green, ‘Editorial Comment: The Annexation of Crimea: Russia, Passportisation and the Protec-
tion of Nationals Revisited’ (2014) 1 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 3, 6.
79‘Remarks: Secretary of State John Kerry at a Solo Press Availability’ (4 March 2014) US Department of
State, http://london.usembassy.gov/europe160.html.
80Quoted in Perraudin (n 24).
81A different conclusion, asserting the continued prevalence of effective control, is given by Olivier Corten,
based on inter alia the international community’s rejection of Russia’s argument that its interventions in
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After this brief examination of the current, somewhat occluded, state of the law surrounding
governmental legitimacy for the purposes of inviting intervention, it is necessary to apply the law
to the use of drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia individually, the idiosyncratic nature of
government in each necessitating careful and distinct analysis.
i. Pakistan
The need to determine the relative inﬂuence of de jure or de facto control is not immediately clear
in the case of drone strikes in Pakistan. The state is represented by the elected government of
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of the dominant Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz political party.
The government has effective control over most of the country and possesses de jure legitimacy,
holding power lawfully according to the Constitution. As such, it is apparent that the central gov-
ernment is legitimate insofar as it is necessary to consent to the use of force within its territory.
Nonetheless, there is a potential objection to the possibility of such consent, which merits con-
sideration presently: all but one of the drone strikes carried out in Pakistan have occurred in
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA or the ‘tribal areas’), the vast majority in
North and South Waziristan,82 regions which exist in a state of semi-autonomy. Due to the
nature of this schism between FATA and the rest of Pakistan, it is potentially arguable that the
central government may lack control over that speciﬁc region and therefore be unable to
consent to uses of force there.
FATA is part of Pakistan according to the Constitution,83 and has a number of members within
the National Assembly84 and the Senate.85 Nonetheless, under Article 247(3), acts of the National
Assembly do not apply automatically to FATA, requiring ﬁrst the direct approval of the President.
Thus the tribal areas have a level of constitutional autonomy that could conceivably alter the oper-
ation of consent by the central government to third state uses of force. In light of the dual-nature of
‘legitimacy’ explored above, it is clear that this constitutional arrangement could be argued to
have implications as to the Islamabad government’s claim to exercise de jure control over the
tribal regions. Nonetheless, Article 247(5) empowers the President to ‘make regulations for the
peace and good government of a Federally Administered Tribal Area or any part thereof’.
Added to this, the tribal areas are represented in the Parliament, having 12 seats.86 These facts
are demonstrative of a level of constitutional integration and control over the tribal areas that
is sufﬁcient to be considered de jure control regardless of the region’s autonomy. This is
further emphasised through international recognition of the tribal areas as part of Pakistan as a
Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1967 were justiﬁed due to invitations extended by members of the
national Communist parties, as well as the French intervention in Côte d’Ivoire in 2011 which was by Secur-
ity Council authorisation rather than an invitation from the ousted elected President. See Olivier Corten ‘The
Russian Intervention in the Ukrainian Crisis: Was Jus Contra Bellum “Conﬁrmed Rather than Weakened”?’
(2015) 2 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 17, 32–35. It is the position of this article that
such a conclusion, though persuasive, does not reﬂect the reality of consent in light of recent practice. This is
particularly so when considered against the examples of intervention by invitation in Yemen and Somalia as
examined presently.
82The single occurrence outside of FATAwas in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. Information taken from a
dataset from The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1NAfjFonM-
Tn7fziqiv33HlGt09wgLZDSCP-BQaux51w/edit#gid=1436874561.
83The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (2010), Art 1(2)(c).
84Ibid, Art 51(3).
85Ibid, Art 59(1)(b).
86Ibid, Art 51.
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corollary of states’ practice in treating the Durand Line as the Western border between Pakistan
and Afghanistan.87
There is, however, potential uncertainty as to the legitimacy of governmental consent when
the tribal areas are considered in terms of de facto control. The tribal areas comprise 13
regions, inhabited mostly by indigenous Pakhtun tribes. In 1893 the region was included
within British India, though it remained isolated, being ‘severely left alone’ by the British auth-
orities.88 This may be something of a simpliﬁcation of the situation during that period, which has
also been declared a time characterised by ‘unceasing struggle against an imperial presence’.89
Nonetheless, both accounts point to a situation of abstract legal control over the tribal areas
but without actual practical control. Reﬂecting the constitutional situation in modern Pakistan,
colonial-era treaties maintained the autonomy of the region within the state. A treaty exemplifying
this asserted that the (British) Government of India ‘has no intention of introducing… regular
administration of a settled district, but…will administer it on tribal lines in accordance with
tribal customs and usage’.90 This situation of governed autonomy continued after the partition
of India and Pakistan in 1947 and the constitutional situation has remained broadly static ever
since.
It has been suggested, however, that since the fall of the Afghan Taliban in 2001 there have
been signiﬁcant increases in militancy in the tribal regions: ﬁghters have crossed the border into
Pakistan, and concomitantly local tribes have risen up to resist attempts by the central government
to reform governance and administration in the region, leading to a dual tribal and militant insur-
gency.91 Notably, the US government’s understanding of the situation appears to conﬂate the
tribal and militant groups, seeing them coalesce under the umbrella of Tehrik-e-Taliban, a
group symbiotically related to al-Qaeda and engaged in attempts to usurp the central govern-
ment.92 Murphy has called this the ‘Talibanization’ of FATA, and concludes that the ongoing
insurgency has the capacity to restrict the ability of the central government to exercise effective
control over the region, questioning its legitimacy and consequently its ability to give valid
consent to uses of force.93
Nonetheless, this depiction of absent effective control is not deﬁnitive and despite the above
pronouncements, a different interpretation of the situation in FATA can be made, adopting a post-
colonial methodology, which asserts greater agency among indigenous tribes vis-à-vis non-
indigenous militants. This consequently gives the counterintuitive result that US drone strikes
can be lawful as it rejects the argument that the central government lacks effective control due
to ‘Talibanization.’
Farhat Taj posits that commentators in the West have uncritically adopted the view that
Pakhtun tribes have willingly embraced militants, asserting instead that, in fact, tribes have
been overpowered.94 In addition to this, Taj refers to the 1901 Frontier Crimes Regulations (pro-
viding the government of British India, then the Pakistani government thereafter, with sweeping
powers over FATA, including the ability to detain all members of any tribes deemed ‘unfriendly’
87Brad L Brasseur, ‘Recognizing the Durand Line: A Way Forward for Afghanistan and Pakistan?’ (2011)
The East West Institute, www.ewi.info/sites/default/ﬁles/ideas-ﬁles/durandline.pdf 7-8.
88Theodore L Pennell, Among the Wild Tribes of the Afghan Frontier (Seeley & Co, 1909) 48.
89Akbar S Ahmed, Resistance and Control in Pakistan (Cambridge University Press, rev edn 2004) 29.
90Agreement Between British and Wana Wazirs no XIX (1921), appended in Ahmed (n 89) 156–57.
91US Department of State, ‘Country Reports on Terrorism’ (2010), www.state.gov/documents/organization/
170479.pdf, 162.
92Ibid, 239.
93Murphy (n 45) 119.
94Farhat Taj, Taliban and Anti-Taliban (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011) 3.
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towards the government,95 collective punishment for individual crimes96 and the removal of
entire villages97) and their impact upon the indigenous tribes’ willingness to act contrary to the
government, stating that ‘[h]ospitality or refuge in FATA to someone wanted by the Pakistani
state is out of the question’.98 It is of note that this argument is made by a Pakhtun academic,
giving it a degree of authority absent in the writings of many Western writers unable to access
the region. The picture that emerges is a counterpoint to the idea of a ‘Talibanization’ of the
region. It instead suggests a situation in which the central government continues to exercise
the same degree of control that has been in place since the formation of the state and earlier.
In addition, regardless of the level of central control over the region, there is no state practice
to suggest that a government is disempowered to consent to the use of force within a speciﬁc
region in which its control is less clear, if it maintains control over the rest of the state.99 This
is unless the conﬂict has reached the level of a civil war in which case consent is unavailable,
for the reasons discussed above.100 In terms of consent to the use of force, the conﬂict
between the government and Tehrik-e-Taliban in FATA does not fall into this classiﬁcation.
Wippman has suggested that in situations in which an incumbent government ‘exercises
control over most of the state’, it ‘ordinarily retains full authority to request external assist-
ance’.101 This, coupled with the existence of a recognisable constitutional framework governing
the relationship between FATA and Islamabad that provides de jure legitimacy, and the absence of
a ‘new single regime in control’,102 leads to the conclusion that, currently, the government of
Pakistan is indeed the legitimate government of the tribal regions and that therefore it may exer-
cise consent to drone strikes. Of course, the logical corollary of this is that the government also
has the ability to revoke consent to drone strikes, which it has done.
ii. Yemen
Conversely, the legitimacy of the government of Yemen is in question, due to the state’s continued
instability. Consent to US drone strikes is purported to have been given freely and clearly, initially
by President Saleh, and is considered by his successor, President Hadi, to continue to be
binding.103 Both presidents held power legally, taking ofﬁce through elections according to
Article 106(a) of the Constitution of Yemen and, as such, there is no real debate concerning
the nature of the government’s de jure legitimacy. It is, however, highly questionable as to
whether the government even remotely has the effective control necessary to be deemed legiti-
mate with regard to consent. In illustrating this, a very brief history of the Yemeni government
is necessary. The post-uniﬁcation government of Yemen has historically had an at times
tenuous level of control over parts of the country. Since 2004 Houthi rebels have been ﬁghting
the regime and in 2011 Ansar al-Shari’a Yemen (ASY), an umbrella group including al-Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), took control of parts of the south of the country, maintaining
95Federal Crimes Regulation (1901), s 21.
96Ibid, ss 22–23.
97Ibid, s 32.
98Taj (n 94) 2.
99Indeed, the 2013 French intervention in Mali provides evidence of practice that asserts the opposite: that a
central government retains the ability to consent to uses of force in regions in which its control has been
vitiated. In this instance, intervention by France came at the invitation of the government of Mali, and
related to the north of the country, which at the time was a region entirely outside of its control.
100See nn 16–18 and accompanying text.
101Wippman (n 69) 213–14.
102Doswald-Beck (n 15) 199.
103Human Rights Watch (n 60) 6.
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control until June 2012 when these regions were retaken by government and local forces sup-
ported by US airstrikes.104
President Hadi came to power in a single-candidate election in the wake of the Arab Spring in
2012, though the nature of this poll (whether it can be said to be in any way democratic) has no
bearing upon legitimacy as currently understood by international law.105 Since the election, the
Houthi rebellion has grown and now poses a serious challenge to the government’s effective
de facto control. In January 2015 the Yemeni capital Sana’a was captured by rebels, who
overran many government buildings106 and subsequently the President and his cabinet resigned
en masse.107 Following this, the President ﬂed the country, suggesting prima facie a lack of effec-
tive control (particularly considering Wippman’s formulation, which bases legitimacy in part on
control of the capital). Regardless, having ﬂed, President Hadi rescinded his resignation108 and
subsequently invited the intervention of Saudi Arabia, which has since lead a coalition of Arab
states in air strikes against the rebels.109 Further, President Hadi has more recently written to
the Security Council requesting further intervention by ground troops.110 Simultaneously, ASY
has taken over large areas in the east of the country; previously the central government had
been able to retake these areas using the armed forces but the Houthi uprising means that the
army and air force are in disarray and, as such, may be unable quickly to regain control.111
The situation in Yemen cuts straight to the core controversy within the doctrine of consent and
the use of force in international law. Arising out of the requirement of legitimacy, there is serious
doubt as to whether a government with such a tenuous grasp over its territory can lawfully request
the intervention of a third state. In a factual sense, it seems impossible that such a government can
speak for the state any longer. As discussed above, this would certainly be the case if the state
were undergoing a civil war, which is the apex of the loss of de facto control. However, the
term ‘civil war’ is unclear in international law and lacks deﬁnition in the doctrine of consent.
An internal armed conﬂict exists when there is ‘protracted armed violence between governmental
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State’,112 but it is sub-
mitted that this is not synonymous with a so-called civil war.
With regard to consent, the armed conﬂict threshold in Tadić is rather low, as it is easily concei-
vable that a government can maintain effective control of a state while engaged in protracted armed
violence against organised armed groups. Thus the presence of an armed conﬂict will not prima facie
104Aaron Y Zelin, ‘Know Your Ansar al-Sharia’ (21 September 2012) Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.
com/2012/09/21/know-your-ansar-al-sharia/.
105Fox (n 71), 837.
106Hakim Almasmari and Martin Chulov, ‘Houthi Rebels Seize Yemen President’s Palace and Shell Home’
(21 January 2015) The Guardian, www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/20/houthi-rebels-seize-yemen-
presidential-palace.
107Hakim Almasmari and Martin Chulov, ‘Yemeni Government Quits in Protest at Houthi Rebellion’ (22
January 2015) The Guardian, www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/22/yemeni-government-quits-houthi-
rebellion.
108AFP, ‘Yemen President “In Safety” as Rebels Advance’ (25 March 2015) The Guardian, www.
theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/25/anti-government-militia-captures-airbase-yemen.
109Dan Roberts and Kareem Shaheen, ‘Saudi Arabia Launches Yemen Air Strike as Alliance Builds Against
Houthi Rebels’ (26 March 2015) The Guardian, www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/26/saudi-arabia-
begins-airstrikes-against-houthi-in-yemen.
110Kareem Shaheen, ‘Yemen’s Exiled Government Asks UN for Ground Troops to Halt Houthi Advance’ (7
May 2015) The Guardian, www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/07/yemen-president-un-ground-
intervention-halt-houthi-rebel-aden-hadi.
111Bill Roggio, ‘Al Qaeda Takes Control of Eastern Yemeni City’ (3 April 2015) Long War Journal, www.
longwarjournal.org/archives/2015/04/al-qaeda-takes-control-of-eastern-yemeni-city.php.
112Prosecutor v Dusko Tadić (2 October 1995) IT-94-1-A, para 70.
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foreclose intervention by invitation. Doswald-Beck has argued that consent becomes unavailable
when ‘the rebellion is widespread and seriously aimed at the overthrow of the incumbent
regime’.113 This stems from the duty of states not to ‘interfere in civil strife in another state’114
and to refrain from ‘participating in acts of civil strife’,115 the discussions surrounding which
were characterised by ‘the idea that the principle of non-intervention was aimed at allowing
certain changes of government and would thus entail the illegality of aiding either side in a revolu-
tion’.116 Indeed, state practice supports a ﬁnding that consent continues to be available beyond this
threshold. In 2013 France used force inMali upon the invitation of the government which at the time
had lost control of the north of the country to organised rebels.117 More recently, international uses of
force in Iraq against ISIL have been hallmarked by consent being given by a government without
effective control of its territory and suffering a serious existential challenge, with that consent being
generally accepted as a lawful justiﬁcation for the force used.118 This suggests that there is a large
degree of latitude of interpretation in terms of the point at which a state will be unable to consent,
mirroring the degree of effective control a government must exercise in order to remain ‘legitimate’.
In light of the above, the responses of states to the government of Yemen’s request for assistance
appear to have afﬁrmed the possibility of consent in circumstances of such systemic conﬂict. Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates speciﬁcally have referred to the Hadi
regime as ‘the legitimate authorities’ in responding to the Hadi government’s invitation for interven-
tion.119 Iran has been the only state to protest foreign intervention as an infringement of Yemen’s
sovereignty.120 Furthermore, in April 2014, the Security Council passed a resolution in which it
reafﬁrmed ‘its support for the legitimacy of the president of Yemen, [President] Hadi’.121 Thus it
is plausible to conclude that based on state practice and equivocal commentary, the international
law on legitimacy has moved away from the privilege given to de facto control emphasised in,
inter alia, the Tinoco arbitration. Consequently the current government of Yemen’s clear lack of
effective control over its territory is not sufﬁcient to remove its ability lawfully to consent to inter-
vention, particularly as there is no new government in place to replace the recognised existing one.
It has been suggested that interventions by consent will be lawful if their objective is not ‘to
settle exclusively internal political strife in favour of the established government’122 which, at
113Doswald-Beck (n 15) 251.
114General Assembly Resolution 2131 (XX) Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Dom-
estic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty (1965), UN Doc A/RES/20/
2131.
115Declaration on Friendly Relations (n 17).
116Doswald-Beck (n 15) 210.
117‘Mali Tuareg Rebels Declare Independence in the North’ (6 April 2012) BBC, www.bbc.co.uk/news/
world-africa-17635437.
118Page (n 24).
119Identical letters dated 26 March 2015 from the Permanent Representative of Qatar to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/2015/217, 3. It
should be noted that this letter refers to an invitation to act under Article 51 and therefore the action is pri-
marily one of collective self-defence, but the key point is that it demonstrates states’ recognition of the legiti-
macy of the beleaguered Hadi regime.
120Carol Morello, ‘Final Make-or-Break Moment for Iran Nuclear Talks’ (26 March 2015) The Washington
Post, www.washingtonpost.com/world/ﬁnal-make-or-break-moment-for-iran-nuclear-talks/2015/03/26/835
ac586-d25e-11e4-8b1e-274d670aa9c9_story.html.
121Security Council Resolution 2216 (2015), UN Doc S/RES/2216. Further speciﬁc reference to the Hadi
regime’s legitimacy was made again at Article 1(d).
122Theodore Christakis and Karine Bannelier, ‘French Military Intervention in Mali: It’s Legal But…Why?
Part II: Consent and UNSC Authorisation’ (25 January 2013) EJIL: Talk!, www.ejiltalk.org/french-military-
intervention-in-mali-its-legal-but-why-part-2-consent-and-unsc-authorisation/.
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least with regard speciﬁcally to the US drone programme in Yemen, is not the case. The strikes
have been occurring since 2002 with the sole purpose of counterterrorism, targeting al-Qaeda and
its afﬁliates. They have not been against the Houthi rebels and as such are unlikely to be deter-
minative as to the outcome of the internal conﬂict. It is therefore submitted that the government of
Yemen can be conceived of as the legitimate government and that, as such, its consent to US drone
strikes is capable of precluding their wrongfulness under jus ad bellum.
iii. Somalia
As with Yemen, the question of governmental legitimacy in the face of tenuous territorial control
is highly pertinent in the case of Somalia. After the collapse of the regime of General Barre in
1991, Somalia has existed primarily without a functional central government and has been charac-
terised by clan rivalries and ‘endless secessionism’.123 In 2004 a Transitional Federal Government
(TFG) was formed under President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, though it faced a continual struggle
against warring groups, including al-Shabab and regional factions. So weak was the ability of the
government to exercise control over the country, it took until June 2007 before the President and
executive were even able to enter the capital city, Mogadishu.124
Mary Harper has described the TFG as a ‘virtual’ government due to its near total lack of
control over the country.125 Concurrent with the continued impotence of the central government,
a number of Somali regions had begun to operate autonomously, notably Somaliland and Punt-
land, each with its own government and administration;126 indeed, Somaliland has been argued
to have a ‘strong legal claim to international recognition’.127 The picture that emerges is of a gov-
ernment, like that of Yemen, with no effective control of its territory, at times without even having
a physical presence in the capital. Despite this, the Transitional Federal Charter, in place until
2012, asserted the indivisibility of Somalia,128 reafﬁrming the country’s post-colonial
borders.129 This, coupled with the absence of recognition by third states of any self-proclaimed
autonomous regions, points to de jure control by the central government, albeit of the most
ephemeral variety. Furthermore, in 2012 the new Somali Federal Government (SFG) was inaugu-
rated and a provisional constitution adopted which makes reference to the unity of Somalia as
‘inviolable’,130 once again reafﬁrming the state’s existing borders.131 The SFG has received
wide international recognition,132 which supports a conclusion that it possesses de jure control
123Raphael C Njoku, The History of Somalia (Greenwood, 2013), 141.
124Ibid, 173.
125Mary Harper, Getting Somalia Wrong (Zed, 2012) 65.
126Ibid, 109.
127Christopher Clapham, ‘Long Walk to Statehood: Why Somaliland Deserves International Recognition’
(2015) Georgetown Journal of International Relations, http://journal.georgetown.edu/long-walk-to-
statehood-why-somaliland-deserves-international-recognition/. Interestingly, Somaliland has received rec-
ognition from the UK cities of Shefﬁeld and Cardiff: see Ruth Mosalski, ‘Cardiff Becomes Only Second
UK Council to Recognise the Republic of Somaliland (26 March 2015) Wales Online, www.walesonline.
co.uk/news/wales-news/somaliland-recognised-by-cardiff-council-8930027.
128Transitional Federal Charter of the Republic of Somalia (2004), Preamble.
129Ibid, Art 2(3).
130Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia (2012), Arts 1(3) and 7(2).
131Ibid, Art 7(5).
132Matt Bryden, ‘Somalia Redux? Assessing the New Somali Federal Government’ (August 2013) Report of
the CSIS Africa Program 23. Recently the US announced that it would establish a diplomatic mission in
Mogadishu: see John Kerry ‘Remarks in Mogadishu, Somalia’ (5 May 2015) US Department of State,
www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/05/241902.htm.
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despite the fact that it has little effective control outside of Mogadishu and depends upon African
Union troops for its continued existence.133
Drone strikes in Somalia have been carried out by the US since 2011134 though consent
appears to have been given as early at 2007; in relation to air strikes generally, President
Mohamed stated that: ‘The US has a right to bombard terrorist suspects who attacked its embas-
sies in Kenya and Tanzania.’135 This statement is primarily in reference to the US’ 1998 claim of
self-defence in relation to the Kenya and Tanzania attacks136 but it can also be understood to indi-
cate President Mohamed’s acceptance of and consent to US strikes in Somalia more generally.
Although not the ‘clearly established’ consent envisaged by the ILC,137 it is nonetheless demon-
strative of an underlying approval.
Much more explicitly, Defence Minister Abdihakim Haji Mohamud Fiqi stated that drone
strikes were ‘welcome[d] against al-Shabab’.138 These expressions of consent, which are far
from deﬁnitive, came from the TFG, which, as demonstrated above, can in no way be said to
have exercised effective control. Doswald-Beck’s depiction of consent stated the importance of
recognition for legitimacy and emphasised that such recognition would unlikely be withdrawn
even in the event that a government had no control if there was no single alternative regime.
Thus, despite the TFG’s Somalia languishing for ﬁve of its eight years as the world’s most
failed state,139 the groups vying to take over140 were disparate and did not provide an alternative.
As such, it appears that the TFG was the legitimate government by virtue of its precarious de jure
control and that consequently its consent to US drone strikes was valid. This adheres with state
practice in which governments without control of their territories have been able to validly
consent to intervention.141 The situation under the SFG is similar to that of the TFG but its
claim to de jure control is stronger as it has greater international recognition.142 As such, it too
is in a position to provide valid consent as the legitimate government, and this has been done
on a number of occasions. In 2013 President Mohamud asserted his support for US drone
strikes against foreign ﬁghters.143 More recently the government has stated that it was at least
‘pre-informed’ of a drone strike, which, coupled with an apparently positive view of the
133Ibid, 1.
134Greg Jaffe and Karen DeYoung, ‘US Drone Targets Two Leaders of Somali Group Allied with al-Qaeda’
(29 June 2011) Wall Street Journal, www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/us-drones-target-
two-leaders-of-somali-group-allied-with-al-qaeda/2011/06/29/AGJFxZrH_story.html.
135‘US Somali Air Strikes “Kill Many”’ (9 January 2007) BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/
6243459.stm.
136Letter dated 20 August 1998 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the
United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc S/1998/780.
137DASR and Commentary (n 4), Art 20, para 6.
138Robert Young Pelton, ‘Enter the Drones’ (7 June 2011) Somalia Report, www.somaliareport.com/index.
php/post/1096.
139According to the Fund for Peace’s annual fragile states index, www.fsi.fundforpeace.org/data.
140Including al-Shabab, the Islamic Courts Union, and the autonomous regions of Somaliland and Puntland.
141For instance, Lebanon’s 1978 consent to UNIFIL intervention; the US’ invasion of Grenada in 1983
which was in part based on the invitation of Governor-General Sir Paul Scoon, acting with no effective
control which nonetheless ‘constitute[d] a recognized basis under international law for foreign states to
provide requested assistance’. See Marian Nash, Cumulative Digest of United States Practice in Inter-
national Law 1981-88 (Department of State Publication, 1995) Book III, 3399. See also consent by
ousted Ukrainian President Yanukovych to Russian intervention in Crimea in 2014, discussed at nn 76–79.
142Recognition has even come from the US, for the ﬁrst time since 1991: see Hillary Rodham Clinton,
‘Remarks with President of Somalia Hassan Sheikh Mohamud after their Meeting’ (17 January 2013) US
Department of State, www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2013/01/202998.htm.
143Josh Rogin, ‘Somali President Asks for More American Help’ (18 January 2013) Foreign Policy, http://
foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/18/somali-president-asks-for-more-american-help/.
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attack, implies continued governmental consent.144 Consequently, though an apparently improb-
able outcome due to the nature of the Somali government, the doctrine of consent as it appears
presently allows the conclusion that it is the legitimate government that has invited intervention,
thereby satisfying that aspect of valid consent. Nonetheless, it must be remembered that due to the
speciﬁc scope deﬁned by President Mohamud targeting is a key issue to maintain the ongoing
lawfulness of drone strikes—any strikes directed against Somalis rather than foreign ﬁghters
will breach the extent of Somalia’s invitation and will require justiﬁcation within the framework
of jus ad bellum.
V. Consent Must Be Given by a Requisite Ofﬁcial
A concern related to the need for consent to be given by the legitimate government of a state is the
requirement that consent be given by an ofﬁcial who represents that government. In its commen-
tary to the DASR, the ILC advocates a contextual approach to consent, stating that ‘[w]ho has
authority to consent to a departure from a particular rule may depend on the rule.…Different ofﬁ-
cials or agencies may have authority in different contexts.’145 As such, there is ﬂexibility as to the
particular ofﬁcial empowered to consent, which allows the doctrine to account for constitutional
variation between states. According to the VCLT, ofﬁcials considered to represent a state without
the need for full powers are heads of state, heads of government and ministers for foreign
affairs.146
One may therefore reasonably conclude that consent to foreign intervention can be given by
one of these three ofﬁcials, due to the nature of the act carried out. This is borne out by state prac-
tice and opinio juris: in 1958 it was King Hussein of Jordan who requested intervention from the
UK;147 President Kabila originally provided consent to the presence of Ugandan troops on the
territory of the DRC;148 and, most recently, force has been used in Iraq against ISIL at the
request of the Iraqi foreign minister.149 In addition to this, the Use of Force Committee ILA
has asserted (in draft) that consent ‘from the military/intelligence services rather than highest
echelons of current government, will not sufﬁce’, subsequently stating that in order to be under-
stood as being on behalf of the state itself, consent must ‘be freely given by the appropriately auth-
orised highest levels of the lawful government’.150 Thus, it is clear that in order to establish the
validity of consent when authorising uses of force, it is necessary to determine its ultimate source.
i. Pakistan
The need for consent to be given by the requisite ofﬁcial is of particular relevance with regard to
the use of drones in Pakistan, due to the various political ofﬁces within the government and their
144‘Government Spokesman says they were Pre-Informed US Drone Strike against al-Shabab Commander’
(18 January 2014) RBC Raxanreeb, www.raxanreeb.com/2014/01/somalia-government-spokesman-says-
they-were-pre-informed-u-s-drone-strike-against-al-shabab-commander/.
145DASR and Commentary (n 4), Art 20, para 6.
146Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Art 7(2).
147Quoted in Doswald-Beck (n 15) 214. It should be noted that the UK invoked collective self-defence to
justify this intervention, but it is nonetheless supportive as to who may give consent.
148Armed Activities (n 18) para 29.
149Martin Chulov and Spencer Ackerman, ‘Iraq Requests US Air Strikes as Isis Insurgents Tighten Grip on
Oil Reﬁnery’ (18 July 2014) The Guardian, www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/18/iraq-request-us-air-
strikes-isis-baiji-oil.
150ILA Use of Force Committee (n 10).
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cleaved nature. The existence of a distinct ofﬁce of President, as head of state,151 and Prime Min-
ister, elected by the National Assembly,152 has the potential to confuse the provision of consent.
Under Pakistan’s constitution the President must be kept informed by the Prime Minister of ‘all
matters of internal and foreign policy’153 but is only empowered to act on the advice of the
Cabinet or Prime Minister.154 The President is thus symbolic, and the Prime Minister is the de
jure principal ofﬁcial able to consent to uses of force by third states.
A further level of complexity is added through the ofﬁce of Chief of Army Staff (COAS),
appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister,155 who, though ultimately sub-
sidiary to the President and Prime Minister, might reasonably be seen to act in their stead and
have the capacity to consent to strikes by US drones.156 Presently, although the current govern-
ment of Pakistan has united in rescinding the previous regime’s apparent consent,157 the COAS,
Reheel Sharif, has been reported to view Pakistan’s bellicose NSAs as the most serious threat to
the country’s security and has actively sought help from the US in addressing it.158 This potential
opposition between civilian and military authorities is similar to the situation in 2008 in which the
then-Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani publicly opposed drone strikes while the then-COAS,
General Ashfaq Kayani, covertly called for a greater US drone presence within Pakistan.159 It
should be noted that in the 2008 instance, while Prime Minister Gilani publicly objected to US
drone strikes, he privately endorsed them, or at least asserted that the government would
remain silent,160 distinguishing that instance from the current situation insofar as there has
been no suggestion that the rescission of consent by the current government is a veil over a con-
tinuing clandestine invitation. Likewise, it has been asserted by Shah that the historic tension
between the government and the COAS has been resolved.161
This further demonstrates the difﬁculty in adducing consent, making a conclusion as to its pres-
ence as a basis for the use of force highly problematic. Nonetheless, in terms of ofﬁcials empowered
to represent the government, the strength of international institutional opinion appears to support the
notion that only the highest ofﬁcials, or those with speciﬁc authority can consent to uses of force
from third states: as stated above, the VCLT reserves the inherent ability to consent to heads of
state, heads of government andministers for foreign affairs alone. Furthermore, considering the con-
textual approach advocated by the ILC in its commentary to the DASR, it is informative to refer to
the 2013 report of Christof Heyns, then-Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary
executions, in which he asserted that when it comes to invited intervention ‘[o]nly the [host] State’s
highest government authorities have the power to give consent to the use of force’ and that ‘[w]here
there is a difference of view between the highest authorities in the Government and lower-level ofﬁ-
cials, the view of the higher-level ofﬁcials should be taken as determinative’.162
151Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (2010), Art 41(1).
152Ibid, Art 91(3).
153Ibid, Art 46.
154Ibid, Art 48(1).
155Ibid, Art 243(1)(b).
156Murphy (n 45) 119.
157Miller and Woodward (n 55).
158‘Old Problems, New Hope’ (13 December 2014) The Economist, www.economist.com/news/asia/
21636088-nato-lowers-ﬂag-taliban-have-not-been-beaten-militarily-politically-they-have-been.
159‘Kayani Wanted More Drone Strikes in Pakistan’ (21 February 2013) Wikileaks, https://wikileaks.org/
giﬁles/docs/30/3049919_-os-us-pakistan-mil-ct-wikileaks-kayani-wanted-more-drone.html.
160Ibid.
161Shah (n 2) 90.
162Christof Heyns, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions’
(13 September 2013) UN General Assembly, UN Doc A/68/382, para 82.
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Although Murphy suggests that in the case of drones in Pakistan the COAS may be empow-
ered to consent, he offers no evidence to support this claim, so it should be treated with caution
in light of the trend favouring a restricted power of consent. Thus, without speciﬁc indications
as to the respective powers of the Prime Minister, President and COAS, it is reasonable to con-
clude that outside states ought to defer to the emphasis within the doctrine that consent must
come from the ‘highest echelons of current government’.163 As a result, it is submitted that
at present there is not enough evidence of consent available for any state to rely upon it to
allow continued drone strikes in Pakistan. As stated above, Murphy adopts the perspective of
international arbitral bodies to argue that secret consent is a sufﬁcient basis for the use of
force as if a claim were ever brought; such consent could be adduced in ‘whatever venue is
necessary’ to conﬁrm the legality of force after the fact.164 Although plausible (and analogous
with the retroactive assertion of sovereignty that occurs with the waiving of a claim under
Article 45 DASR) for present purposes such reasoning is too speculative to enable the con-
clusion that consent has been given. This is particularly the case in light of the explicit rescind-
ing of consent by the Pakistani Prime Minister, the condemnation of drone strikes by the
parliament165 and the expulsion of the US from Shamsi airbase in 2011, from which drones
had been ﬂown.166 It is consequently submitted that until such evidence to the contrary
comes to light, these actions of the government of Pakistan should be taken to be indicative
of an absence of ongoing consent for drone strikes.
ii. Yemen
The ‘requisite ofﬁcial’ aspect of Yemen’s consent is far less controversial than was the case in
terms of the examination of the legitimacy of the government. It was concluded above that the
Hadi regime is presently the legitimate government of Yemen insofar as consent to military inter-
vention is concerned. It has been demonstrated that both Presidents Salem and Hadi had been
elected in accordance with the constitution and that, as such, consent given by them can
clearly be seen to come from a requisite ofﬁcial, in accordance with the DASR and VCLT.
General consent to the use of drones by the US was purportedly given by Saleh and conse-
quently maintained by Hadi.167 While the regime remains the legitimate government this
consent will continue to be authoritative. Nonetheless, the recent Emmerson report stated that
the government had asserted that ‘the United States routinely seeks prior consent, on a case-
by-case basis… and that where consent is withheld, a strike will not go ahead’.168 The report
notes that this is contrary to the general consent referred to by President Hadi detailed by
Human Rights Watch, and calls for clariﬁcation from the government. It is therefore worth
noting that—in the view of the present author—if the case-by-case approach to consent is the pre-
vailing method, it is necessary to determine which ofﬁcial within the government is providing this
consent to be able to conclude that it is validly given.
163ILA Use of Force Committee (n 10).
164Murphy (n 45) 118.
165Qasim Nauman ‘Pakistan Condemns US Drone Strikes’ (4 June 2012) Reuters, www.reuters.com/article/
2012/06/04/us-pakistan-usa-drones-idUSBRE8530MS20120604.
166Saeed Shah, ‘Pakistan Orders US to Leave Airbase in Row Over Deadly NATO Assault’ (27 November
2011) The Guardian, www.theguardian.com/world/2011/nov/27/pakistan-orders-us-leave-shamsi-airbase.
167Human Rights Watch (n 60) 6.
168Ben Emmerson, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protect of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism’ (2014) Human Rights Council, UN Doc A/HRC/25/
59, para 29.
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iii. Somalia
Similarly, when considering the need for consent to have been provided by the requisite ofﬁcial, the
situation for Somalia is much more straightforward than might be expected, considering the proble-
matic situation in terms of legitimacy. There have been statements by the presidents of both the
TFG169 and SFG170 providing evidence of consent to the US drone programme by ofﬁcials who
fall into the categories of ofﬁcials required by Article 20 DASR, Article 7(2) VCLT and state prac-
tice. Under Article 39 of the Transitional Federal Charter the president is head of state and comman-
der-in-chief of the armed forces, therefore rendering the consent to airstrikes by President Abdullahi
Yusuf Ahmed valid. Similarly, the 2012 Provisional Constitution reasserts the president as head of
state171 and commander of the armed forces172 and provides the ofﬁce-holder with the ability to
declare war173 thereby conﬁrming that the president is empowered to invite outside intervention.
As detailed above, President Mohamud has referred to his own support for US drone strikes.
This does not demonstrate the unequivocal and overt assertion of consent that would dispel con-
fusion as to its existence but nevertheless allows for the inference that the invitation for US
drone strikes has indeed come from the requisite ofﬁcial and is, therefore, likely to be valid.
VI. Consent and Breaches of International Law
This ﬁnal section will examine the breadth of the exculpatory potential of consent once its valid pres-
ence has been established. It has been discussed above that consent, as an exercise of sovereignty,
removes speciﬁc uses of force from the jus ad bellum framework, but that is not where the debate
over the power of consent ends. ‘Wrongfulness’ under international law can arise in relation to the
forcible actions of states in many ways, not purely under the jus ad bellum. It will be recalled that
Article 20 DASR only precludes the wrongfulness of an act ‘to the extent that the act remains
within the limits of… consent’, which clearly demonstrates a bounded rather than unlimited under-
standing of consent. This refers to the need for conduct to remain within the terms imposed by the
consenting government, in the manner envisaged by Article 3(e) of the Deﬁnition of Aggression
and its focus on ‘contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement’.174 Nonetheless,
the reference by Article 20 to the ‘limits of consent’ points to the presence of wider considerations
of lawfulness, speciﬁcally whether actions that would otherwise be unlawful in international law,
like breaches of IHL or IHRL can be rendered lawful through the operation of consent. As such, it
is of critical importance to note the debate surrounding the scope of conduct carried out under the
ambit of the consent, which concerns whether or not consent renders lawful any actions of an inter-
vening state which would otherwise be contrary to international law.
O’Connell maintains a restrictionist interpretation when considering this question, stating
that:
Even where the US is using drones on the basis of consent from the [host] state, that state may not
consent to use military force on its own, against its own people, except when it is engaged in
armed conﬂict hostilities.175
169BBC (n 135).
170RBC Raxanreeb (n 144).
171Provisional Constitution of the Federal Republic of Somalia (2012), Art 87.
172Ibid, Art 90(b).
173Ibid.
174General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) Deﬁnition of Aggression (1974), Art 3(e).
175Mary Ellen O’Connell, ‘Remarks: The Resort to Drones under International Law’ (2011) 39 Denver
Journal of International Law & Policy 585, 597.
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In this way, she posits the classiﬁcation of violence as a key caveat to the doctrine of consent:
military force—which O’Connell argues Hellﬁre missiles ﬁred from a drone are an example
of176—may only be resorted to once ﬁghting has reached the threshold of an armed conﬂict.
As a corollary of this, she concludes that drones cannot be used outside of an armed conﬂict (a
‘law enforcement’ paradigm177). Thus, as well as discerning the existence of consent, it would
be vital to establish the nature of the violence in which force was being used because unless
an armed conﬂict exists, drone strikes could never be lawful, regardless of consent from the
host nation.
In diametric opposition to this, adopting a very broad understanding of the capacity of consent
to render conduct lawful, Anders Henriksen has suggested that consent has the effect of ‘preclud
[ing] the unlawfulness of the use of force by one state in another state, even in cases where the use
of force would have been unlawful if carried out by the consenting state.’178 This interpretation
thus appears to allow the recourse to drone strikes regardless of the nature of the paradigm in
which they are used and, furthermore, seems to suggest that consent operates to foreclose
other considerations of state responsibility under international law (principally in relation to
IHL and IHRL). It could be that Henriksen is referring purely to unlawfulness under jus ad
bellum, stating that ‘valid consent from a host state will… always absolve the state from inter-
national legal responsibility under jus ad bellum’,179 but it is unclear whether he has in mind
broader international law considerations. If his intention is simply to refer to jus ad bellum,
then the conclusion that consent renders lawful uses of force that would otherwise be unlawful
if carried out by the host state is puzzling because consent (as has been noted) removes uses of
force from the jus ad bellum framework; unlike consent which does not infringe sovereignty,
the jus ad bellum provides an ‘excused violation’ of sovereignty180 and does not apply to internal
uses of force.181 As such, it would seem that Henriksen is suggesting that drone strikes that have
been consented to will not be subject to the regimes of IHL or IHRL, which makes his position a
radical one in which consent has almost total exculpatory power.
The two polarised understandings of the effect of consent represented by O’Connell and Hen-
riksen are two ends of a spectrum and it is submitted that the reality falls somewhere in between.
At least part of the intermediate area between the poles of interpretation is evident in Article 53
VCLT in which a ‘treaty is void if… it conﬂicts with a peremptory norm of general international
law’ and, more speciﬁcally, by Article 26 DASR which afﬁrms that wrongfulness cannot be pre-
cluded for ‘any act…which is not in conformity with an obligation arising under a peremptory
norm’. These two provisions demonstrate that consent cannot be viewed as providing total excul-
pation for internationally wrongful acts per se. At the bare minimum consent will not render
lawful force used in contravention of peremptory norms. Nonetheless, this clearly applies only
to rules of jus cogens and, as such, does not apply to the majority of IHL or IHRL rules.182 It
176Ibid, 588.
177Paul Alston, ‘Study on Targeted Killings’ (2010) Human Rights Council, UN Doc A/HRC/14/24/Add.6,
para 31.
178Anders Henriksen, ‘Jus ad bellum and American Targeted Use of Force to Fight Terrorism around the
World’ (2014) 19 Journal of Conﬂict & Security Law 211, 220.
179Ibid.
180ILA Use of Force Committee (n 10) B.4.
181See Noam Lubell, Extra-Territorial Uses of Force against Non-State Actors (Oxford University Press,
2010) 8 (arguing that in such instances the jus ad bellum ‘loses its relevance’).
182See Rafael Nieto-Navia, ‘International Peremptory Norms (Jus Cogens) and International Humanitarian
Law’ (2001) Coalition for the International Criminal Court www.iccnow.org/documents/
WritingColombiaEng.pdf. It has been suggested by Nieto-Navia that paras 1 and 2 of common Art 3 of
the Geneva Conventions can be seen as ‘truly peremptory in nature’, and, as such, there is a prima facie
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is therefore necessary to consider whether or not consent renders lawful breaches of international
legal norms that are not jus cogens.
Alston has emphasised the distinct characters of the different legal frameworks (and therefore
the nature of force available to states) that operate within and without armed conﬂicts. Speciﬁ-
cally, the lawfulness of state killing under the regime of IHL within an armed conﬂict (in
which combatants or civilians directly participating in hostilities183 may be targeted) is so mani-
festly different from that of IHRL, outside an armed conﬂict (in which killing may only be used
when it is the sole means of protecting life184), that it is logical to conclude that states using force
with governmental consent would nonetheless need to remain within those respective parameters.
Alston asserts the continued application of these parameters to the activities of both the consent-
ing and targeting states, recognising a positive obligation on the part of the consenting state to
require the targeting state to demonstrate that force used will be lawful. Nonetheless, he also
holds that this does not absolve the victim state from responsibility, stating that if breaches of
IHL or IHRL have occurred, the host state should ‘seek prosecution of the offenders and compen-
sation of the victims’.185 It must be noted that Alston asserts that within a law enforcement para-
digm ‘it is never permissible for killing to be the sole objective of an operation’.186
Similarly, Heyns conﬁrms that states cannot consent to interventions that breach IHL or IHRL
and that they have an obligation to ensure this does not happen.187 Larson and Malamud have also
emphasised this interpretation of consent—as mandating an obligation upon both acting and con-
senting states to ensure force adheres to international law—by opining that:
If Pakistan has consented to the drone strikes, then the United States and Pakistan must still ensure the
legality of the strike. A ﬁnding that the cross-border incursion is ‘legal’ does not relieve States from
their obligations to follow the Law of War.188
Consent conceived of in this manner is restricted to rendering lawful only the resort to force,
having no impact upon broader international law obligations.
Schmitt has asserted that ‘[o]f course, the [host] state may only grant consent to operations
that it could itself legally conduct’ and that, as a consequence, the host state ‘cannot lawfully
allow attacks that would violate applicable human rights or humanitarian law norms, since it
does not itself enjoy such authority’.189 Likewise, Ashley Deeks is clear that consent should
not ‘serve as a standalone basis for force when the host state’s consent exceeds what it could
do under its own laws’, asserting that this accords with the teleology of the UN Charter.190
Deeks, like Alston, understands consent as creating responsibilities, though she places such
responsibility principally with the acting state, proposing the recognition of a ‘duty to
inquire’.191 This requires that states actively ascertain a consenting state’s domestic law governing
inability for consent to absent responsibility for any drone strikes that might have been carried out in contra-
vention of this Article. However, questions of jus in bello are beyond the scope of the present article and must
be left open at this stage.
183Geneva Conventions (1945), Common Art 3.
184Alston (n 177) paras 30–33.
185Ibid, paras 37–38.
186Ibid, para 33 (emphasis in original).
187Heyns (n 162) para 38.
188Kurt Larson and Zachary Malamud, ‘The United States, Pakistan, the Law of War and the Legality of the
Drone Attacks’ (2011) 10 Journal of International Business and Law 1, 13.
189Schmitt (n 21) 315.
190Ashley S Deeks, ‘Consent to the Use of Force and International Law Supremacy’ (2013) 54 Harvard
International Law Journal 1, 35.
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force and subsequently ensure compliance in the course of intervention,192 non-compliance creat-
ing a situation she terms ‘unreconciled consent’.193 It is submitted that, particularly if considered
with the arguments of Alston and others detailed above, this duty implicitly includes the require-
ment that force be used in accordance with international law. Indeed, due to the general appli-
cation of much international law in this area it is not a stretch to suggest that in instances of
intervention by invitation, the duty to inquire is vitiated in favour of a presumption of understand-
ing in which states are expected to know and abide by international law—states conducting inter-
ventions have signiﬁcant bureaucratic and legal resources which one would hope at the very least
signify a knowledge (regardless of interpretation) of the applicable law governing uses of
force.194 The key point is that Deeks’ interpretation of consent does not prohibit uses of force
such as drone strikes outside of an armed conﬂict, but nevertheless emphasises that such force
operates within, and is subject to, the domestic and international legal framework, thereby con-
ﬁrming the impossibility of consent abstracting uses of force from the regimes of IHL and
IHRL. These writers’ positions all indicate that drone strikes may be difﬁcult to justify in a
law-enforcement paradigm, but they do not go as far as O’Connell’s suggestion that they are
per se unlawful outside of an armed conﬂict.
Additional insight as to the exculpatory nature of consent may be gleaned by considering
statements made by governments with regard to invited interventions against ISIL in Iraq. As
stated above, the intervention against ISIL is complex as it spans both Iraq and Syria. Article
51 has been invoked, citing the collective self-defence of Iraq which could replace consent as
the justiﬁcation for uses of force.195 However, the invocation of Article 51 is for uses of force
carried out in Syria rather than Iraq, as the Syrian government has not given its consent. Thus
consent can still be seen to provide the primary justiﬁcation for force in Iraq and, as such, the
statements of intervening governments can provide authoritative interpretations of the remit of
consent. In 2014, a senior White House ofﬁcial stated that ‘any actions [taken in Iraq]…
would be consistent with international law, as we have a request from the Government of
Iraq’.196 This assertion as to the consistency of force with international law suggests a wide under-
standing of the exculpatory power of consent but it does not go so far as to allow the conclusion to
be reached that consent renders all conduct lawful, but rather seems likely to refer solely to leg-
ality under jus ad bellum. This appears to be the same understanding posited by the UK, which
has stated that consent provides ‘a clear and unequivocal legal basis’ for the use of force, but
nonetheless emphasised that such action would be taken ‘in accordance with applicable inter-
national law, including international humanitarian law’.197 It is therefore clear that those states
currently conducting forcible interventions by invitation understand themselves to be bound by
191Ibid, 35.
192Ibid, 35.
193Ibid, 21.
194For the ﬁnancial year 2016 the US Department of State, Ofﬁce of the Legal Advisor has requested a dip-
lomatic and consular service budget of nearly $13.5 million: see ‘Congressional Budget Justiﬁcation:
Department of State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs’ (2016), www.state.gov/documents/
organization/236395.pdf, 15.
195See n 24.
196Background Brieﬁng by Senior Administration Ofﬁcials on Iraq (8 August 2014) Ofﬁce of the Press Sec-
retary, The White House, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁce/2014/08/08/background-brieﬁng-senior-
administration-ofﬁcials-iraq.
197‘Summary of the Government Legal Position on Military Action in Iraq Against ISIL’ (25 September
2014), www.gov.uk/government/publications/military-action-in-iraq-against-isil-government-legal-position
/summary-of-the-government-legal-position-on-military-action-in-iraq-against-isil.
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international legal obligations other than those governing the recourse to force itself: that is to say
that uses of force are understood to be subject to IHL and IHRL.
There is an absence of unanimity in this area but the majority of authors who have examined
consent and the use of drones acknowledge that the exculpatory potential of consent is not
absolute and that its power begins and ends with the removal of uses of force from the framework
of jus ad bellum. Crucially, this accords with the practice and rhetoric of states, which supports a
conclusion that consent has a purely gatekeeping role in allowing the use of force but has no
bearing upon the nature of that force (a determination that is left to other legal frameworks).
Therefore, when consent is adduced to allow the use of armed drones, and can be asserted
without equivocation, such use is still subject to IHL and IHRL, it does not operate in a legal
vacuum. Conversely, armed drone use outside of an armed conﬂict is not unlawful per se, regard-
less of consent, as argued by O’Connell: it simply operates subject to the framework of IHRL. It is
possible that the magnitude of force delivered by a drone will never be lawful outside of an armed
conﬂict paradigm but that is a consideration outside of consent and therefore beyond the scope of
this article.
VII. Conclusion
Untangling consent to intervention is a challenging task, due to its conceptual and practical com-
plexity and indeﬁnite structure. This is in large part due to its nature as a legal doctrine that oper-
ates in a distinctly political manner, the effect of which is to remove force from its legal
framework and abstract it from its international context into a national one. As such, it is not
characterised by the trail of artefacts of legal assertion present when force is justiﬁed by, for
instance, self-defence—the US has acted with the consent of the governments in whose territory
their drones ﬂy but it has not been posited in the same manner as legal justiﬁcations under jus ad
bellum. Despite this difﬁculty, it has been possible to adduce the presence of consent from each of
Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia and to assert its validity when given, meaning that in each case it
has been capable of rendering lawful the resort to armed drones.
Nevertheless, it is evident that consent in each of these instances (particularly in relation to the
use of drones in Yemen and Somalia) remains highly problematic. The reality is that consent fails
to live up to the billing that it receives as being a trump card for the extraterritorial use of armed
drones. This analysis has highlighted the disconnect between the discursive employment of
consent within the drone debate and its often tenuous operation in fact.
In Pakistan, leaked memos have provided evidence of the existence of consent by the legit-
imate government to the US drone programme, which is valid regardless of its secrecy, though
this has subsequently been retracted. Despite this retraction, the US has continued to carry out
drone strikes, meaning that, at least since 2013, self-defence under jus ad bellum must act as jus-
tiﬁcation. In Yemen and Somalia, consent has been publicly and broadly given and has not been
withdrawn at any point (indeed, in both cases it has been consistently reiterated by heads of state).
However, both states suffer from a signiﬁcantly questionable claim to be the legitimate govern-
ments, as one is engulfed in a growing internal conﬂagration with little to no territorial control,
while the other attempts to drag itself into legitimacy after 24 years of reputed state failure. As
such, the use of drones by invitation in both instances is shaky and vulnerable to refutation; con-
sequently, in neither situation should justiﬁcations of jus ad bellum be dispensed with. It is there-
fore important to recognise that though consent removes the use of force from the jus ad bellum
framework, that framework cannot be ignored due to the problems inherent within a situation in
which a state needs to invite intervention: the absence of control.
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Regardless of consent’s abstraction of the use of force by drones from its legal context, there
are still many legal questions to be answered. Consent operates only in terms of the gateway law-
fulness of drone strikes—the practicalities of their use are still very much embedded in inter-
national law. The legality of the resort to drone strikes says nothing about the legality of how
they are employed. As such, there remains important work to be done in terms of drones
within the structure of IHL and IHRL, which must not be overlooked.
The fact that consent to drone strikes has been able to be adduced in each of Pakistan, Yemen
and Somalia begs an obvious further question as to the nature of the doctrine of consent itself.
That is whether consent in its present conﬁguration—in which it is apparently possible for gov-
ernments with no effective control of a state to consent to interventions—is desirable or even
tenable. The doctrine of consent is subject to great conceptual and normative vagueness, allowing
for a broad spectrum of interpretation, which manifests in its ability to provide a wide range of
lawful justiﬁcations for uses of force. Works like that of Doswald-Beck and, more recently,
Fox have attempted to map the doctrine in a systemic manner, but its indistinctness is present
even within these depictions. Consent has the potential to be used not just for security but to
assert the geopolitical dominance of powerful states, particularly those that possess the signiﬁcant
infrastructure necessary to ﬂy armed drones. Consequently there is a pressing need for further
critical analysis of this justiﬁcation for the use of force.
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